- <u>Concepts</u>: (1) Congress has a legitimate concern in overseeing the implementation of the Treaty.
  - (2) The Executive, in fulfilling its responsibility for carrying out the terms of the Treaty, requires flexibility and privacy in dealing with the Soviets on issues of possible violation (the SCC forum in Geneva has been useful in part because of the privacy observed).
  - (3) On timeliness, then, the Executive has a requirement for some period of internal debate and of negotiation with the Soviets. The Congress has a need to ensure that issues of compliance are not hidden from oversight for long periods or indefinitely.
  - (4) On substance, the Executive and the Congress both need full details on issues of compliance so as to judge whether the Soviets are in compliance with the Treaty.
  - Status: (1) Raw intelligence data on SALT compliance is presently disseminated only within the Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Community then disseminates through the National Intelligence Daily (NID) preliminary evaluations of such SALT-related intelligence.
    - (2) The DCI's SALT Working Group then develops a Community view on such intelligence; forwards it to the SCC; and the SCC recommends to the President what, if any, action to take.



- (3) The SALT Working Group publishes a semi-annual report on SALT monitoring.
- Proposal: (1) That raw intelligence continue to be held within the
  Intelligence Community.
  - (2) That preliminary evaluations of such intelligence continue to appear in the NID and be distributed to Congress.
  - (3) That following Presidential decisions on issues of possible violation, the Congress be informed, through the intelligence oversight committees.
  - (4) That the semi-annual report of the SALT Working Group be made quarterly and be provided to the oversight committees; and that this report include a summary of all issues of potential violation raised in the Working Group regardless of whether the Working Group subsequently passed them to the SCC.